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| Tank Battles of 1971 Indo-Pak War Fought Mostly in Plains of J&K | | | Anil Bhat | 12/22/2011 8:00:19 PM |
| During the run-up to the 1971 India-Pakistan war, after one of the many operational conferences held in 4th(Hodson's) Horse, Major SJ (later Lt Col) 'Jiti' Chaudhary, C squadron commander , declared that he would consider 'being at war' only when a tank of Hodsons Horse stood on Pakistani soil and fired a round from its 20 pounder gun and that he would then concede a bottle of Scotch to any person taking him on for a bet. On 5-6 December 1971, moments before this regiment's B Squadron crossed the international border, its commander, then Maj (later Brig) Jasbir 'Jas' Hundal called Jiti on the radio: "Jas to Jiti…standby…. (in the background)… shell 800 on fire (booom) main gun destroyed enemy OP (observation post) tower..Over". Jiti responded: "Jiti to JasOkay...okay….stop rubbing it in, ….you'll get your bottle…!" This was the regiment which led the advance into Pakistan across the Basantar river, known as Degh Nadi in Pakistan and remained in the lead till the end of the 13 day war. Destroying disproportionately large number of Pak armoured corps then quite new Patton tanks with World War II vintage Centurians, the CO, Lt Col (later Lt Gen) RM Vohra was awarded Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), Majors Govind Singh, Kamal Nanda and Jiti Chaudhri were awarded Vir Chakra (VrC). Jas Hundal was short-changed by being awarded Sena Medal (SM), because the infantry company commander fighting alongside his squadron, Maj Hoshiar Singh, 3rdGrenadiers, got one of the two Param Vir Chakra (PVC) of that war.
Major (later Brig) Amarjit Singh Bal was commanding a squadron of The Poona Horse (17th Horse) , which was to establish and defend a secure bridgehead on the Basantar river in Shakargarh area. Located at Jarpal, overlooking the river, his squadron was most vulnerable to enemy attack. Despite heavy shelling by Pak artillery, repeated counter-attacks while being heavily outnumbered for over two days, Major Bal was able to inspire his men to repel destroying as many as 27 Pakistani Patton tanks. Major Bal was awarded the MVC.
Another officer of The Poona Horse and the youngest to get the PVC-postumously- was Arun Khetarpal's whose role in the Battle of Basantar, did not end with this thirteen-day war, resulting in the demise of East Pakistan and the creation of the newly liberated Bangladesh. Major Khwaja Mohammad Nasir, the squadron commander of Pak army's 13th Lancers fighting against Poona Horse, who came bandaged the next day to collect the dead bodies of his fallen comrades, wanted to know more about " the officer, who stood like an insurmountable rock" and whose troop of three Centurian tanks was responsible for decimation of his entire squadron of fourteen Patton tanks. His bandages were owing to injuries sustained by him in the final engagement of his and Arun's tank. 13th Lancers is the same regiment which exchanged its Sikh squadron with the Muslim squadron of The Poona Horse, during partition in 1947.
Nasir's tribute to Arun did not end in the battlefield in December 1971. Arun's father, Briadier (retd) Madan Khetarpal, residing with his wife, Maheshwari, in New Delhi, had for long nursed a desire to visit his hometown, Sargodha, Pakistan. Speaking to this writer, he mentioned that in 2001, when he sounded his old friend, retired Lieutenant General Kirpal Singh Randhawa, of 7th Cavalry, who after retiring had visited Pakistan a number of times, the latter took his passport and brought it back a few days later with the Pakistan visa stamped on it. Not only that; he had also arranged with his Lahore's Aitchison's College- mate, the same Khwaja Mohammad Nasir, by then a Brigadier and manager of Pakistan's cricket team, to host Brigadier Khetarpal. During this visit, Nasir hesitatingly admitted that he was the one at whose hands Arun got killed. "…he (Arun) was singularly responsible for our failure. He was a very brave boy…", said Nasir to the senior Khetarpal, who even in his sorrow, stoically remained an officer and a gentleman.
Lt. Col (later Brig) Sukhjit Singh, was commanding The Scinde Horse (14th Horse), which was deployed in Shakargarh. On the night of 8th December, the regiment crossed into enemy territory and established itself near Nainakot. On 10 December, Pak forces launched a powerful armoured attack, which the regiment resisted determinedly. Leading from the front, Sukhjit directed his tanks with great skill and courage. The enemy, having lost one of its tanks retreated. The next day, when Sukhjit led an operation to capture enemy tanks at Malakpur, under heavy artilery and mortar fire. Unruffled, he surged ahead and in the ensuing engagement 8 tanks and some Pakistani officers were captured. Not only did Sukhjit awarded the MVC for his inspirational leadership, his regiment earned several battle honours for its exceptional courage. Lt. Col (later Brig) Narinder Singh Sandhu, 3rd Cavalry, was tasked to lead 10 Dogra to secure the eastern end of the vitally strategic bridge over the river Ravi at Dera Baba Nanak, threatening Indian positions at Pathankot, Beas and Amritsar. Pakistan had already prepared several fortified shelters and machine gun positions and to make matters worse, as Sandhu began his attack on the evening of 5th December, his tanks got stuck in the marshes bordering the river. His men then dismounted and began the five-kilometer march to the bridge. Stalking till they were15 meters away from the bridge, they sprang out at the enemy with their battle- cry "Durga Mata ki Jai". Leading from the front throughout this fierce engagement despite being wounded in the leg and inspiring his men , they emerged victorious and Sandhu was awarded the MVC.
Of the 66 gallantry awards conferred on Indian Army's armoured corps personnel, apart from Arun, who got one of this war's two PVCs, there were four MVCs, 23VrCs, one Vishishtha Seva Medal, 17 SMs(including one posthumous) and 21 Mentioned-in -Despatches. Of the MVC awardees, Brig AS Vaidya, The Deccan Horse, awarded for the second time, later became Army Chief and after retirement was killed by Khalistani terrorist Harjinder Singh, aka 'Jinda, at Pune) , Lt Cols RM Vohra and NS Sandhu and Maj AS Bal are already mentioned.
Space not permitting to go into details of all tank battles of the Western theatre stretching from Chamb and Sambha sectors of Jammu in Jammu and Kashmir to Punjab and right up to Laungewala in Rajasthan, I have had to resort to selective reader-friendly accounts. While 4th Hodson's and 17th Poona Horse fought the most intense tank engagements in the Battle of Basantar, 7th Cavalry, 8th Cavalry 9th Deccan Horse, 72 Armored Regiment, 20th Lancers and more deserve mention for the Western theatre and 63rd Cavalry and 45th Cavalry, 69th Armoured Regimentand an independent squadron of 7th Cavalry for their role with amphibious tanks in the Eastern theatre. 7th Cavalry deserves mention for Maj (later Lt Gen) MS Shergill getting a Vir Chakra for capture of Chak Amru railway station and pushing two enemy tank regiments 15 kms backwards. Its independent squadron in East was awarded Battle Honour Mian Bazaar.
Some of Pak armoured corp's major drawbacks, which caused them very heavy losses of Patton tanks against Indian Army's Centurian tanks were: (a) their tank gunners were not even familiar with the gunnery procedure applicable to the Patton tank and (b) owing to fear of dying by flames, Pakistani tank crew bailed out as soon as their tank was hit even if it had not caught fire and its guns were still functional.
While official accounts of Pak army paint a bright picture of its performance during this war, some Pakistani officers have been bluntly critical about its blunders. Commenting on the Battle of Barapind-Jarpal (we called it Battle of Basantar ) as "one of the bloody and pointless battles of the 1971 war" Pakistani columnist, Maj (retd) Agha Humayun Amin wrote (an excerpt : Impact of Experiences of 1965 War on the Principal Decision Makers' Minds…..Most analyses of Barapind-Jarpal are unfortunately superficial because they concentrate on the superficial aspects of the whole affair. The principal reason for the failure at Barapind was neither the artillery factor, nor the assessment of situation, nor incompetence of the armoured brigade commander but something much deeper. This was the deep impact of experiences of 1965 war on the principal decision makers' mind (e.g. 4th Hodson's Horse in the 1965 Indo-Pak War destroyed 69 enemy tanks and 17 recoilless guns). The conduct of the two tank regiments clearly point towards doctrinal procedural and tactical failures particular to the armoured corps.Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General) who was from 13 Lancers categorically said that the armoured briagde commander asked both 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry to attack as soon as possible implying that there was no need to cut short the batle procedure and there was no need to panic;but both the units and specially 13 Lancers cut through various parts of the battle procedure like liaision with infantry,preliminary recce etc leading to the phenomenal tank losses that it later suffered.Even the method of attack of both units was different;which proved that even at brigade level;tactical thinking was whimsical and differed from unit to unit;even in important things like basic drills of operations of war! There is one fact which is missed in most analyses of the Battle of Barapind and most other tank battles of Indo-Pak war. This refers to handling of units above regiment level. There is one striking parallel between Battle of Gadgor fought in 1965 where 25 Cavalry checked the 1st Indian Armoured Briagde(ie 1st Indian Armoured Div) and in Barapind where 16 Light Cavalry stopped the whole 8 Armoured Brigade. The fact that stands out is that handling of unit till regiment level was good in defence while handling of units beyond brigade level was extremely poor and especially in offensive operations! The failure at Barapind was later rationalised by saying that the Indian threat was grave and that the blunders committed were a natural result of the confusion caused because of the gravity of the threat! We will examine this extremely fallacious assertion in brief. The principal decision makers as we have seen assessed that the enemy in front was a troop of tanks or a squadron and thought in a most cavalier manner that it could be swept aside by just sending a tank regiment without any deliberate corps artillery support! The corps commander specifically used the words restore the situation by use of minimum force, thus implying that the threat was not as grave as to merit the employment of maximum force! The battle of Bara Pind was not only a failure of Brigade and Corps level but also a failure at tactical level. It is unfortunate that while the armoured brigade commander was criticised, the fact that execution at regimental level played as much a part in failure as the higher headquarters was ignored. Quad Era Demonstrandum. |
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