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| Dixon Plan: Moves appear afoot to divide Jammu on communal lines | | |
RUSTAM
EARLY TIMES REPORT
JAMMU, June 17: Dixon also asked New Delhi to withdraw its Army and disband the Jammu and Kashmir State forces and State Militia. Subject to the need of (a) assisting the civil power in maintaining law and order, and (b) guarding the northern approaches to the Valley against possible incursion. (Indirect admission that Jammu and Kashmir is part of India) For the so-called Azad Kashmir, Dixon's plan was to attach a United Nations officer to each district magistrate of the area for ensuring fair and impartial administration.
What Dixon suggested was not acceptable to New Delhi. The reason: The existing district magistrates of the area had been appointed after the invasion by Pakistan. As for Gilgit-Baltistan, Dixon's Plan was to appoint a political agent or agents of the United Nations in consultation with India and Pakistan. Such agents were to act through the existing channels of authorities.
Not just this, Dixon also suggested several other alternatives. One of them was for forming a coalition government through meeting of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Choudhary Ghulam Abbas. Besides, he intended to place certain portfolios at the disposal of the respective parties. But his proposals had no taker. His other alternative was the creation of a set-up consisting of "trusted persons outside politics, holding high judicial or administrative offices and commanding public confidence." "The Hindus and Muslims would be equally represented with a United Nations deputed Chairman." His third plan was to have an "administration containing United Nations representatives." None of these proposals was acceptable to New Delhi. A coalition government was not possible in view of widening gulf between the different parties of the state at that time.
New Delhi found a contradiction between the position from which Dixon had started and the actual plan he framed. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru asserted, among other things, that "India could not ask the state to disband its militia, which was acting as the police, as it would prejudice the organization of the state, that India could not countenance for a moment the idea of limiting its forces in the area because of the presence of the invading elements within its territory."
As Dixon could not succeed in obtaining the Indian agreement to conditions which, in his opinion, would ensure a fair and impartial state-wide plebiscite, Dixon tried at a conference with the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers, to "ascertain their reactions to two alternatives: (a) a plan for holding plebiscite by sections or areas and the allocation to India or Pakistan of each section or area according to the result of the vote therein, (b) a plan for allocation of areas certain to vote for accession to either country and a plebiscite for the uncertain area of the Valley of Kashmir." The initial reaction of Pakistan was "one of total opposition", but India agreed to consider this approach.
Convinced that there was no possibility of a "mutual agreement", Dixon applied himself to the task of preparing a plan and having it either accepted or rejected or modified by agreement. He revived the old idea of administration by United Nations officers, now for the limited plebiscite area. He devised the completely new formula that this administration would be competent to exclude the troops of every description, or, if they were found necessary, they would ask the parties to provide them. India emphatically refused to agree to any such provision for it amounted to equating the aggressed and the aggressor.
Sir Owen Dixon left the sub-continent on August 23, 1950. Thus, ended another phase of United Nations' mediation in the India-Pakistan dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. He filed his report with the Security Council explaining in detail his negotiations and the failure of his mission.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected out-of-hand the Dixon's report immediately after its publication. He rejected the report on five specific grounds. One, the implementation of the Dixon Plan "would turn Kashmir into an area of communal bigotry, where plebiscite would be neither fair nor peaceful." Two, "there could be no question of India abdicating her constitutional rights in Kashmir." Three, "Pakistan could have no standing in the dispute." Four, "India had a painful experience of coalition governments - a paralysis results out of an admixture of incompatibles." And, fifthly, "the United Nations could not be a substitute for India, so far as the obligation to safeguard the security of the state is concerned." (To be continued)
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