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| Doval’s Diplomacy and a New Turn in India–China Relations | | | Lalit Gargg
After several years of strained relations, India and China now appear to be entering a new phase marked by dialogue, restraint and pragmatic cooperation. This should not be viewed as a sudden transformation, but rather as part of a long-term process that seeks to balance security, diplomacy and national interests. In this evolving scenario, the role of National Security Adviser Ajit Doval has emerged as particularly significant. The 25th round of the Special Representatives’ talks, held in Beijing on August 25 with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, has provided a concrete foundation for this process. Both sides agreed to maintain peace along the border, make early and meaningful progress towards boundary delimitation, and strengthen the mechanism for military-to-military bilateral communication.
Doval’s visit to Beijing was significant not merely because it focused on the border dispute. It also addressed the broader question of whether India and China, despite their strategic competition, can find a path towards coexistence, stability and mutual interests. The two countries agreed to establish two additional military contact points and two additional military hotline links in the eastern and central sectors. They also decided to advance border trade, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, and cross-border cooperation. The greatest strength of Ajit Doval’s approach is that he does not view security and diplomacy as mutually exclusive. His approach is clear: a strong security architecture provides the foundation for effective diplomacy. In the context of China too, India’s message has consistently been that complete normalization of bilateral relations is impossible without peace and stability along the border. This Indian position was once again prominently reflected in the 25th round of talks.
Doval is not merely a negotiator; he is a seasoned security strategist. He served for many years in the intelligence establishment, worked in several sensitive regions and later became Director of the Intelligence Bureau. According to the Government of India, he played an important role in dealing with security issues relating to the Northeast, Sikkim, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Pakistan. He is also the country’s longest-serving National Security Adviser. His working style reflects a remarkable balance—firmness where necessary and dialogue wherever an opportunity exists. His role in the surgical strikes following the Uri attack, the Balakot operation, diplomatic efforts during the Doklam crisis, and the strengthening of India’s internal security framework are regarded as examples of this broader strategic approach. In 2026, while presenting him with the Lokmanya Tilak National Award, Union Home Minister Amit Shah also highlighted his contribution to strengthening India’s national security apparatus.
The most difficult phase in India–China relations began after the violent clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020. For nearly four years, military tensions continued along the border. Following the disengagement of troops and resolution of related issues in October 2024, a gradual process of restoring bilateral relations began. During their meeting in Kazan that year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of maintaining peace along the border and ensuring that differences did not affect the overall direction of bilateral relations. It was at this juncture that Doval’s role assumed even greater importance. The process that began with Special Representatives-level talks in December 2024 has now reached its 25th round. The eight-point understanding reached this time indicates that the dialogue is no longer merely a formal exercise. Activating expert and working groups for boundary delimitation and border management, using existing military and diplomatic channels to prevent misunderstandings along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and creating new communication mechanisms are important practical steps towards building confidence.
India–China relations are not confined to military posts and diplomatic meetings. The two countries also share a long history of civilizational interaction. The resumption and expansion of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, reopening border trade routes and increasing people-to-people contact are part of this broader approach. In 2026, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra has been conducted through both the Lipulekh and Nathu La routes. The 25th round of talks welcomed progress towards reopening three designated border trading points and agreed to further strengthen trade and pilgrimage links. This is by no means a minor development. Reducing the number of troops along the border is a security measure, but increasing trade and cultural interaction among people living on both sides of the frontier can create the social foundations for lasting peace. The possible visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India could be both an opportunity and a test. Against this backdrop, global attention is focused on the BRICS Summit scheduled to be held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026. There is speculation that President Xi Jinping may visit India. If the visit takes place, it would reportedly be his first visit to India in seven years. Various reports suggest that he may be accompanied by a large delegation of nearly 400 officials. However, as of August 27, China has not officially confirmed his visit.
Therefore, Xi’s possible visit should not be viewed merely as participation in an international summit. It could provide an opportunity to assess the real direction of India–China relations. The 2019 Chennai Connect was held in a relatively cordial atmosphere, but a year later, the Galwan clash plunged bilateral relations into a deep crisis. If Xi now visits New Delhi, both countries will have an opportunity to carefully rebuild the trust that was severely damaged. However, India must not allow enthusiasm to overshadow its fundamental security concerns. China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh, the unresolved issue of boundary delimitation, and the need for greater transparency along the LAC remain significant challenges. Therefore, India’s policy should be guided by a clear principle: aspiration for friendship, but no compromise on national interests.
This is precisely what distinguishes Doval’s approach: he does not allow dialogue to become a sign of weakness, nor does he equate strength with confrontation. The message underlying his diplomacy is clear—India wants peace, but not at the cost of its security; it seeks cooperation, but on the basis of equality; and it wants improved relations, but not by ignoring the realities along the border. Today, as India–China relations stand at a critical juncture, Doval’s role appears to be evolving beyond that of a crisis manager into that of a confidence-builder and architect of security-driven diplomacy. The eight-point understanding reached during the 25th round of talks demonstrates that even amid the most difficult differences, channels of dialogue can remain open.
Xi Jinping’s possible visit to India could provide this process with political direction at the highest level. Yet the real measure of success will not be a photograph from a summit meeting. It will lie in lasting peace along the border, mutual trust, stronger trade and people-to-people connectivity, and a fair and mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding disputes. India must improve its relations with China, but it must do so while safeguarding its strategic autonomy and security preparedness. The essence of Doval’s diplomacy is precisely this: the doors of dialogue must remain open, but the threshold of national interest must never be weakened. This approach could offer India and China the most practical pathway—from confrontation to competitive coexistence, and ultimately towards lasting peace and stability. |
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