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| Threat from Pak real, after Nagrota terrorist attack | | | Early Times Report
JAMMU, Dec 12: After the highly strategic and fortified Nagrota Army Camp terrorist attack, which left seven armymen, including two young Majors, dead, certain persons are once again asking the wrong questions: "Was this another intelligence failure?" "Have the surgical strikes failed to deter Pakistan?" "Is Narendra Modi's Pakistan policy failing?" "Are talks a better alternative to rising tensions on the border?"
The more relevant questions to ask are: Is the Government of India, according to Major-General (Retd) GD Bakshi, "raising the costs for Pakistan's state sponsorship of terror?" Is the Indian strategic response - military, special covert ops, diplomatic and economic - now more coordinated than before? Does Delhi know what can be achieved through talks and what can only be achieved by force or the threat of force? Does Delhi fully understand Pakistan's strategy, and does it have a long-term, constantly evolving, counter to deter it ?
India's strategic counter to Pakistan's long-term strategy of using "non-state actors" to bleed India with "a thousand cuts" must be equally long-term in nature. It should not be "knee-jerk" or a reaction to events. The "surgical strikes" that followed the Uri attack on an army camp would have no meaning unless these tactics are repeatedly used to raise the costs for Pakistan. They need to continue, with each covert action building on the learnings from the previous one. The only thing India needs to avoid is the need to publicly tom-tom every action for political mileage. For, such a policy has proved counter-productive.
After Gurdaspur, Pathankot and Uri, Indians knew that Islamabad had shifted its focus away from civilian targets to symbols of the Indian state - particularly the army. How is it that one year later, the army is still offering itself as a sitting duck for jihadi shooters? Why is the periphery around army encampments not flooded with roving counter-terror operators, taking the defence to offensive status?
Why is the supply of pro-India guerrillas to neutralize the jihadi elements still so weak?
Why have none of the terror masterminds in Pakistan been targeted by our covert forces? When Pakistan can do the denials, why can't India?
Why does retaliation for Nagrota have to wait for weeks before it happens? Shouldn't this option have been ready since we knew such things can happen any time? One thing appears absolutely clear: India really lack a strategic think-tank. India needs to have one and without losing a moment as it is to deal with a rogue state. This think-tank needs to help define India's long-term and short-term ational objectives, and not just produce responses to Pakistani perfidies. Should our goal be containment of Pakistani terror, or the dismemberment of Pakistan?
What are the ways to drive a wedge between Pakistan and China? Will humiliating the Pakistani army (as the surgical strikes attempted to do) help reduce its power inside Pakistan or enhance it? |
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