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| Chanakya vs Confucius | | | K.C. Singh
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's China visit commencing May 14 has been preceded by public debate in India and the US on dealing with China. The mood was set by eminent US strategic thinker of Indian origin Ashley Tellis and Robert Blake, former ambassador to India, in a piece for the Council on Foreign Relations titled "A New US Grand Strategy Toward China". They recommend US outreach to old and new friends on the Chinese periphery, new preferential trading arrangements like the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, ramping-up of US military capability to retain the edge and the denial of cutting edge technologies to China. Michael Pillsbury in The Hundred-Year Marathon also explores the incipient hegemonic underpinnings of the Chinese mind. These counter the Henry Kissinger mantras of Chinese rise being a benign historical event and that China should be engaged and not contained.
Arun Shourie, a hallooed voice from the right, similarly cautioned Prime Minister Modi against being swept by Chinese pomp and economic carrots as fundamental areas of dissonance and persistent Chinese conduct, impinging on national security, need addressing. Promptly contradicting voices were heard, including one absolving Chinese of responsibility for Pakistani sponsorship of terror. He forgot that the Chinese transfer of missile and nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan is what emboldens persistent errant behaviour, its nuclear deterrence negating conventional Indian military retaliation.
Thus, Prime Minister Modi's China sojourn commences as China pushes its "One Belt One Road" mesh of overland and maritime connectivity, ramps-up its Pakistan connection by a $46 billion infrastructure plan, prepares for competing with India in Nepal rehabilitation and re-building, rejoices over 57 countries joining its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) despite the US opposition and thus ostensibly undercutting the Asian Development Bank, speeds-up its control of disputed islands and shoals in the South China Sea by rapid building of facilities, etc. These are actions of a revisionist power using salami slicing by series of small steps, to collectively impact the existing post-World War II security and economic order.
The 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference) showed relative changes in stature of India and China. In 1955, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was the cynosure of attention, even chaperoning Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai while now not only Prime Minister Modi did not attend, but the Chinese President Xi Jinping was the star.
President Xi's India trip in September last, despite the theatrical Ahmedabad reception stretching well beyond protocol, was marred by the People's Liberation Army intrusion across the Line of Actual Control. So far no such distraction has occurred, usually normal before high-level visits. Perhaps the Chinese leaders realise that Mr Modi offers a genuine opportunity for re-calibration of bilateral relations.
Chinese tend to separate the negotiable items from their "core issues". Even in 1972, Mao Zedong in his talks with President R. Nixon put the Taiwan issue aside for subsequent handling without compromising on their claim. Chinese list of "core" interests has also evolved over time. Hillary Clinton recounts in Hard Choices that South China Sea claims and the "nine-dash line" emerged for the first time in their bilateral talks in 2010. Similarly, Chinese claim over Arunachal Pradesh, described as South Tibet, has been more vociferous lately despite the 2005 agreement on principles to settle the disputed border, which specifically excludes areas with settled population.
Mr Kissinger's warning on Chinese negotiating tactics and diplomacy is germane. He says Chinese do not consider the "opening of a particular negotiation a transformational event". Personal relations do not affect their judgments though they may "invoke personal ties to facilitate their own efforts". They also have "no emotional difficulty with deadlocks", treating impatient interlocutors with contempt and "making time their ally".
Sino-Indian issues are both tactical and strategic. Amongst the former India seeks predictability at the LAC, balanced trade, China opening service, agriculture and other protected sectors of Chinese economy, foreign direct investment from China, etc. The Chinese seek level playing field and restrictions on visas and investment to be removed, special economic zones for their investors, penetration into critical Indian infrastructure, etc.
At the strategic level, India wants China to recognise Indian core concerns - boosting Pakistan's nuclear weapon and conventional capability, building dams and tampering with rivers flowing to South Asia, surrounding Indian periphery with captive ports with military potential and hollowing out Indian industry with their exports. China would want curbs on Tibetans, specifically Dalai Lama, dilute growing Indian proximity to the US, Japan and Vietnam, accelerated development of Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, China Economic Corridor and ensure India does not join regional voices in condemning Chinese unilateralism in its maritime neighbourhood.
Unlike Prime Minister Modi's earlier trips to China as chief minister, now the strategic dimension hovers over him and economic and investment choices cannot be made in isolation. For instance, while China protests loudly over the slightest Indian action in Arunachal Pradesh, why is India reticent over Chinese presence in Pakistan-occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir, including perhaps elements of PLA? India's China policy has to be embedded in its larger Asia policy to ensure leverage in dealing with China. India needs time, investment, growth acceleration and military and technological boost. While China wants a stake in Indian growth, it is not about to do what US did for China, i.e. help India rise. Hopefully, Indian Prime Minister's Chanakyan wisdom will match the Confucian sagacity of Mr Xi. The future of Asia rests on how Sino-Indian relations, which will simultaneously have cooperation, competition and even friction, are managed over the coming decades.
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